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ABSTRACT
The arguments for Free-Trade presented in the earlier Lectures do
not coincide with those provided in the Wealth of Nations . It is
argued that these differences may tell us about the possible influence
of the Physiocrats as well as Adam Smith's political leanings.

POLITICAL FREE TRADE?: THE LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE
AND THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
That the argument for Free Trade in the Lectures on Jurisprudence
differs in significant ways from that in the Wealth of Nations is a
point that appears to have escaped notice so far. Two different argu-
ments for Free Trade are given in the Lectures and neither of them is
quite the argument later provided in the Wealth of Nations . In view
of the importance of Free Trade both In the history of economics as
well as in Adam Smith's own conceptual scheme it is worth examining
this difference more closely. After describing the axiomatic basis
for Free-Trade, as developed primarily in Book. IV of the Wealth of
Nations
,
in the rest of the Introduction, section II goes on to quote
from the Lectures on Jurisprudence to illustrate how the argument
there differs from that in the Wealth of Nations . Section III con-
siders the possible significance of the change in argument, which
moves us away from the utilitarian framework of the "Mercantilist"
literature towards the economic aspects of the natural-law tradition
of moral philosophers, while Section IV considers how the change in
argument may have Influenced the perception of Smith as a
"politician." The argument in the Wealth of Nations
, it will be re-
called, is based on three axioms.
Al. Individuals wish to maximize wealth.
A2. Individuals know better than governments how to maximize
their own wealth.
A3. National wealth is the sum of individual wealth.
Al and A2 establish that a policy of non-interference will make indi-
viduals richest, while A3 makes this policy socially optimal also. So
-2-
far, the axioms establish that leaving a people free to trade is the
best way to enrich them. To apply it to international trade, we need
to add
A4. In international affairs, nations are to be treated as
individuals.
By means of A4 a conclusion which had been widely accepted for
domestic trade was projected into international trade. The reader
will recall how something very much like A4 is to be found in Dudley
3
North's Discourse on Trade, and one is tempted to think of the influ-
ence of Hugo Grotius, Samuel Pufendorf and the school of distinguished
seventeenth century theorists of international law. Francis Hutcheson
was the most prominent teacher of these doctrines in Britain and Smith
no doubt imbibed a great deal from them. Nonetheless, the case for
free trade in the Lectures is not unfolded in axiomatic fashion, and
does not reflect these moral philosophers.
Before turning to the economic arguments of the Lectures
,
it may
be useful to provide some illustrations of the earlier use of personal
relations in giving a basis for international relations. The follow-
ing are taken from the systematic and scholarly exposition of Richard
Zouche (1650) 4
To community in time of peace belongs also owner-
ship... and such ownership, in movable goods, is
acquired generally by the same modes as among pri-
vate persons .
There is due between different princes or peoples a
right of civil convention, by virtue of which they
bind themselves , as do private persons .
As lawsuits arise from wrongs and injuries between
private persons, so wars arise between those
[peoples] who have no judge. [emphasis added]
-3-
II. There are actually two different arguments for free trade in the
Lectures . The first one develops the therae that wealth and abundance
are the same and things that are abundant must be cheap. In the
quotes that follow from the Lectures it is important to note that
"natural price" as used by Smith has no necessary relationship with
natural-law and is simply Smith's way of describing the remuneration
necessary to attract and keep someone at any given job.
Whatever policy tends to raise the market price
above the naturall one diminishes publick opulence
and naturall wealth of the state. For dearness and
scarcity, abundance and cheapness, are we may say
synoniraous terras. For whatever abounds much will be
sold to the inferior people, whereas what is scarce
will be sold to those only of superior fortune, and
the quantity will consequently be small. So far
therefore as any thing is a convenience or necessary
of life and tends to the happiness of mankind, so
far is the dearness detrimentall as it confines the
necessary to a few and diminishes the happiness of
the inferior sort. Whatever therefore raises or
keeps up the price of them diminishes the opulence
and happiness and ease of the country.
On the basis of this argument, monopolies, which raise market price
above natural price, are seen to be detrimental to economic welfare.
The market price can also be below the natural price due to a
bounty. In this case, more workers are attracted into the favored
industry. Since this influx of workers means a loss of workers from
other industries—an implicit use of "full employment" and explicit
use of the wages-fund model—the value of aggregate produce is said to
be lower. This part of the argument is developed more through example
than through a chain of reasoning.
The price of grass being raised, butcher's meat,
in consequence of its dependence upon it, must be
raised also. So that if the price of corn is dimin-
ished, the price of other commodities is necessarily
-4-
raised. The price of corn has indeed fallen from 42
to 35, but the price of hay has risen from 25 to near
50 shillings. As the price of hay has risen, horses
are not so easily kept, and therefore the price of
carriage has risen also. But whatever encreases the
price of carriage diminishes plenty in the market.
Upon the whole, therefore, it is by far the best
police to leave things to their natural course, and
allow no bounties, nor impose taxes on commodities.
The second argument starts with the premise that all voluntary
exchange is mutually advantageous. It is embedded within a detailed
attack on the principle that opulence consists of money.
The bad idea of publick opulence consisting in
money has been productive of other bad effects.
Upon this principle most pernicious relations have
been established. These species of commerce which
drain us of our money are thought dissadvantageous
and these which increase it beneficial; therefore
the former are prohibited and the latter encour-
aged.
All commerce that is carried on betwixt any two
countries must necessarily be advantageous to both.
The very intention of commerce is to exchange your
own commodities for others which you think will be
more convenient for you. When two men trade be-
tween themselves it is undoubtedly for the advan-
tage of both. The one has perhaps more of one
species of commodities than he has occasion for, he
therefore exchanges a certain quantity of it with
the other, for another commodity that will be more
useful to him. The other agrees to the bargain on
the same account, and in this manner the mutual com-
merce is advantageous to both. The case is exactly
the same betwixt any two nations . [emphasis added]
After this explicit identification of the principles guiding two-
person and two-nation trade there follows an argument that, since rich
men gain more than poor men when they trade, rich nations will gain
Q
more than poor nations when they trade.
In general we may observe that these jealousies and
prohibitions are most hurtfull to the richest
nations, and that in proportion as a free commerce
-5-
would be advantageous. When a rich man and a poor
man deal with one another, both of them will in-
crease their riches, if they deal prudently, but
the rich man's stock will increase in a greater
proportion than the poor man's. In like manner
,
when a rich and a poor nation engage in trade the
rich nation will have the greatest advantage , and
therefore the prohibition of this commerce is most
hurtful to it of the two. All our trade with
France is prohibited by the high duties imposed on
every French commodity imported. It would however
have been better police to encourage our trade
with France. [emphasis added]
After some further description of the silliness of the system which
9identifies money and wealth, Smith concludes:
From the above considerations it appears that
Brittain should by all means be made a free port,
that there should be no interruptions of any kind
made to forreign trade, that if it were possible
to defray the expences of government by any other
method, all duties, customs, and excise should be
abolished, and that free commerce and liberty of
exchange should be allowed with all nations and
for all things.
The first argument provided in the lectures has a modern ring in
that a demand-supply framework is (implicitly) used to evaluate the
costs of economic policy; the second argument, on the other hand, has
a definite axiomatic ring to it—all free exchange is mutually
beneficial—but it does not quite tell us how to make the transition
to the growth of national wealth. The first argument may be con-
sidered a "cost-benefit" or utilitarian approach, while the second one,
although noticing the benefits of freedom, flows more easily from a
natural rights framework. Before proceeding to discuss the possible
implications of the change in argument, it is worth noting Keynes'
view that there was a general presumption that the two methods would
lead to the same conclusion.
-6-
Suppose that by the workings of natural laws indi-
viduals pursuring their own interests with
enlightenment in conditions of freedom always tend
to promote the general interest at the same time!
To the philosophical doctrine that government has
no right to interfere, and the divine that it has
not need to interfere, there is added a scientific
proof that its interference is inexpedient. This
is the third current of thought, just discoverable
in Adam Smith who was already in the main to allow
the public good to rest on "the natural effort of
every individual to better his own condition," but
not fully and self-consciously developed until the
nineteenth century begins. The principle of
laissez-faire had arrived to harmonise individual-
ism and socialism, and to make at one Hume's egoism
with the greatest good of the greatest number.
Nonetheless, the potential for a conflict was clearly stated by
11Bentham.
I have not . . . any horror, sentimental or
anarchical, of the hand of government. 1 leave it
to Adam Smith, and the champions of the rights of
man (for confusion of ideas will jumble together
the best subjects and the worst citizens upon the
same ground) to talk of invasions of natural
liberty, and to give as a special argument against
this or that law, an argument the effect of which
would be to put a negative upon all the laws.
-7-
III. Why did Smith change the nature of the arguments for free trade
in the period between the Lectures and the Wealth of Nations ? Let us
first note the internal weakness of the argument based on differences
in market and natural price. The link between cheapness and abundance
is flawless and the argument against having market prices higher than
natural prices a valid conclusion therefrom. However, the claim that
bounties actually hurt is not clearly developed. Instead of focussing
upon the inefficiency of taxing people to pay for the bounty, Smith
goes on to talk about grass and fodder and so on. The inconclusive-
ness of the argument probably struck him during the composition of the
Wealth of Nations . Secondly; it should be noted that the utilitarian
approach to free trade did not entirely disappear from the Wealth of
Nations . The analysis of scarcities in Book IV provides a curious
example where a conclusion as strong as that of a natural rights argu-
12
raent is drawn from a "cost benefit" analysis. Thirdly, it has been
noted that Smith's price theory in the Lectures , but not in the Wealth
13
of Nations
,
is based upon labor as the only cost of production.
Could the move to incorporate non-labor costs have convinced Smith
that the contrast between market price and natural price was in-
adequate for his purposes? By rejecting an argument based on prices
and taking up one based on the benefits of freedom, Smith is moving
towards the Pufendorf-Hutcheson legacy over time. As the cost-
benefit approach can lead to a defense of intervention—witness
Bentham's Defense of a Maximum—there is the possibility that Smith
wished to minimize any exceptions to free trade.
-8-
If it is indeed true that Smith altered one of his main arguments
against government interference between the Lectures and the Wealth of
Nations
,
could the change have had something to do with the Physiocrats?
This is a connection that has been raised and dismissed often. In
past discussions of Physiocratic influence, such as that of Edwin
Cannan, most attention has been drawn to the insertion of a theory of
distribution in the Wealth of Nations . Perhaps this is due to Dugald
Stewart's claim, in his Account of Smith's life, that Smith was in
possession of his principal free-trade results by 1755. However, in
the quote accompanying this claim, there are only results, such as
the beneficience of free trade, but no proofs .
Little else is required to carry a state to the
highest degree of affluence from the lowest
barbarism but peace, easy taxes, and a tolerable
administration of justice; all the rest being
brought about by the natural course of things. All
governments which thwart this natural course, which
force things into another channel, or which en-
deavour to arrest the progress of society at a
particular point, are unnatural, and, to support
themselves, are obliged to be oppressive and
tyrannical . . .
Smith's membership in a society which awarded premiums, the Edinburgh
Society, provides some circumstantial grounds for believing that Smith
was not quite seen as an ardent supporter of "Free-Trade" until after
his professorial days. The prevailing contrary impression is probably
due to John Rae's claim that
In his [Smith's] lectures on jurisprudence and
politics he had taught the doctrine of free trade
from the first, and not the least remarkable result
of his thirteen years work in Glasgow was that
before he left he had practically converted that
city to his views
-9-
A careful consideration of the self-interest of the (protected) trade
of Glasgow merchants would lead us to think otherwise. While this
claim of Rae's has been repeated by various scholars, Rae himself
1 f\
contradicts it 30 pages later.
those Glasgow merchants . . . are not necessarily
free-traders because they want free import of raw
materials. That was advocated as strongly from the
old mercantilist standpoint as it is now from the
free-trade one.
How are we to tell whether Smith was able to justify his conclusion in
the quote provided by Dugald Stewart? The existence of a different
argument in the Lectures suggests that Smith may have begun from a
natural rights basis in the 1750s, abandoned it for about a decade,
and then returned to it again. Whether or not the return was stimu-
lated by the Physiocrats we do not know. When Stewart first discussed
Smith's priority on this issue, in 1793, he was convinced of Smith's
independent discovery of free trade. The Lectures on Political
Economy
, delivered by Stewart between 1798 and 1810, are not as clear
on this point and in these lectures Stewart even suggests that Smith
was a popular version of Physiocratic ideas. There have been similar
"underground" comments on the Physiocrat-Smith connection in the
literature, but few detailed arguments. Mogens Boserup writes, in his
book of readings, that he has chosen extracts from Smith in order to
illustrate the fact that Smith "may be understood as a successor of
the Physiocratic school." Hans Breras makes a more pointed remark,
"Much of what Smith had to say had been said before—but in French.
Academic etiquette of his day demanded no acknowledgements, and he
offered none." In view of the fact that the early perception of Smith
-10-
in Germany was as a Physiocrat, this is perhaps an issue worth
*j , • 17reconsideration.
-11-
IV. The attraction of the approach eventually adopted in the Wealth
of Nations is its close link with natural rights arguments and politi-
cal radicalism. The fact that Smith had placed human labor as the
primary agent for creating wealth no doubt helped this link. Smith's
sympathy for laborers and farm workers and his hostility towards
masters and landlords has long been noted. Combined with the general
emphasis on liberty (one recalls the radical stress on liberty given
by his old teacher, Hutcheson) , the ideas would appear as a powerful
dissolvent of traditional ideas, especially in Europe, a fact appre-
18
ciated by such commentators as Charles Ganilh and Adolphe Blanqui
Wealth, produced by labour—restores man to his
primitive dignity, through the sentiment of his
independence, through his obedience to laws common
to all, and his sharing in the benefits of society
in proportion to his services (Ganilh)
there were no longer any sterile occupations, since
every body was capable of giving things an exchange
value, by means of labor. What an encouragement to
men ill-favored by fortune and to those who did not
expect the boon of an inheritance! (Blanqui)
It is a noticeable feature of Smith's analysis that he takes the
possibility of harmful effects due to a violation of natural rights to
be sufficient grounds for believing that harm actually does occur.
The Laws of Settlement are a case in point.
The link between natural-rights economics and political radicalism
would have been evident to contemporaries and it perhaps explains the
fact that the first Parliamentary reference to the Wealth of Nations
was made by someone ignorant of economics, by Charles James Fox, a
19
reference that helped to bolster sales considerably. Subsequently,
we find some early favorable references to Smith in William Godwin and
-12-
Tom Paine, while one of Smith's earliest admiring editors, Jeremiah
Joyce, also provides evidence of being a political radical by his
sharp criticism of that instrument of tyranny—the national debt.
Another admirer of Adam Smith, Thomas Archard, wrote a pamphlet
defending the suppression of the French Nobility. Lord Lauderdale,
later a sharp critic, was a radical in his youth, when he is said to
have "worshipped" Smith. The point is further strengthened by Lord
Cockburn's comment that Smith's death was ignored by all except the
political youth of Scotland. In 1793 the Marquis of Lansdowne even
went so far as to claim that the ideas of the French Revolution were
not new but had in fact been propounded earlier by such respectable
British authors as Adam Smith and Dean Tucker. Dugald Stewart stated
that people who once associated with Adam Smith, felt embarrassed
about any association with "liberal" principles in the wake of the
French Revolution. John Rae has provided a perceptive statement of
20
the political impact of Free Trade ideas in the 1790s.
By French principles the public understood, it is
true, much more than the abolition of all commercial
and agrarian privilege which was advocated by Smith,
but in their recoil they made no fine distinctions,
and they naturally felt their prejudices strongly
confirmed when they found men like the Marquis of
Lansdowne, who were believers in the so-called
French principles and believers at the same time
in the principles of Adam Smith, declaring that the
two things were substantially the same.
Nor should this entirely surprise us. That Adam Smith had a par-
tiality for radicalism is evidenced by his admiration for both
21Rousseau and Voltaire,
-13-
Voltaire set himself to correct the vices and
follies of mankind by laughing at them, and some-
times by treating them with severity, but Rousseau
conducts the reader to reason and truth by the
attractions of sentiment and the force of convic-
tion. His "Social Compact" will one day avenge
all the persecutions he suffered.
Janes Seattle criticized David Hume's skepticism in his Essay on Truth
and later wrote to Lady Wortley Montagu that even though he had known
Smith well once, after the publication of the E ssay on Truth—"nous
22
avons changez tout cela.""
The early supporters of Free Trade in English economic thought
were almost certainly motivated by political considerations—in that
free trade with France, the traditional enemy, was a part of the Tory
agenda. With the rise of Sir Robert Walpole, however, the Whigs began
to cautiously adopt the same "Tory" attitudes towards trade with
France. Philosophically speaking, the attitudes of the natural rights
school were far more consonant with the writers of Cato's Letters or
the Commonweal thmen surrounding Lord Molesworth. The attitudes that
encouraged the philosophy of laissez-faire had considerable roots in
liberal religious and political thought, as noted by Jacob Viner and
M. L. Myers." Ashley's influential view that Smith's contribution lay
in making a Tory doctrine, Free Trade, acceptable to Whigs is liable
to misinterpretation unless one recognizes that the underlying reasons
for the same policy had changed considerably. It is no accident that
both John Locke and, a half century later, Bishop Law, embody the same
24
complex of political and theological notions. When Francis Horner
refused to make public his criticisms of the Wealth of Nations because
the good effects of that book were yet to be spread further he may
•14-
well, as a staunchly liberal Whig, have had the politico-economic
impact in mind. The attitude is more explicit in John Stuart Mill's
?5
stated reason for adhering to laissez-faire in 1833.*"
In the meantime that principle, like other negative
ones, has work to do yet, work mainly of a destroy-
ing kind, and I am glad to think it has strength
enough to finish that after which it must soon
expire; peace be with its ashes when it does expire,
for I doubt much- if it will reach the resurrection.
Insofar as the movement towards a philosophic basis for free trade had
socio-political origins, Smith supports the thesis of Leo Rogin that
"new systems first emerge in the guise of arguments in the context of
j i c m26social reform.
Finally, it is worth reiterating that Smith is by no means so
strongly a free trader in his Lectures
,
as in the Wealth of Nations .
Emphasis does a lot in an argument, and the emphasis on free trade in
the Lectures
,
relative to all the other matter there, even within the
economic sections alone, is not as strong as it subsequently became in
the Wealth of Nations . If we add to this the fact, already noted by
the editors of the Lectures
,
that the Lectures take a more positive
view of government, as well as the fact that the Lectures accept some
common beliefs, such as the backward bending supply curve of labor and
the validity of "balance-of-employment" arguments, it would appear
that Smith's classroom lectures were not as revolutionary when deliv-
27
ered as they appeared to be with hindsight. Smith's friends were
not engaging in repetitious praise when they greeted the Wealth of
Nations as a system , as though this were an aspect of Smith hitherto
28
undeveloped. They knew well a professor of philosophical history,
-15-
whose economic interpretations gave them considerable pride, but the
99
author of an axiomatic basis for free-trade was a revelation."
-16-
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